

NSC BRIEFING

4 November 1953

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

I. No fundamental change in the Sino-Soviet relationship since Stalin's death:

- A. Peiping's status in Soviet bloc remains far superior to that of Eastern European satellites;
- B. At the same time, Peiping remains firmly committed to the Soviet world-view and world program;
- C. Peiping's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union is great and increasing;
- D. Prospect is for the Sino-Soviet alliance to remain firm.

II. Moscow has not moved farther toward direct control of Peiping:

- A. Moscow gives Mao Tse-tung special stature among non-Russian Communist

leaders:

- B. Moscow gives China special mention, distinct from the "People's Democracies";
- C. Soviet propaganda ~~has begun to insist~~ ^{presents} ~~that~~ ^{as} China ~~is~~ a world power politically and militarily;
- D. ~~Moscow is again presenting China, after~~ ^{and after} a ~~two-year~~ ^{and} silence on this subject, ~~as~~ the model for other Asian Communist movements;

- F. The Kremlin does not seem to be disputing Peiping's authority in the border regions of ~~Northeast China~~ (Manchuria), Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, ~~and Tibet~~, although the Port Arthur ^{Dairen} [^]

naval base area continues to be

occupied [redacted] at

Peiping's request; ~~and~~ *under extension of 1950 agreement.*

G. The current purge of the Chinese Communist Party, which may involve several central committee members, does not seem to be directed by Moscow.

III. The Peiping regime, ^{is today} Moscow's only genuine ally, ~~remains faithful~~:

- A. Although the Kremlin would presumably prefer to control Peiping directly, it does not need to do so at this time;
- B. Peiping has repeatedly expressed its confidence in the new Soviet leadership, has reaffirmed that Sino-Soviet friendship is "unbreakable," and has insisted that the Chinese Communist Party will continue to be modeled on the Soviet Party;

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- professed*
- C. Recognizing Peiping's fidelity,
Malenkov has recently stated publicly
that the future of China is "in
reliable hands";
- D. Peiping has continued to follow the
Soviet lead in ~~all~~ foreign affairs; no
difference between Soviet and Chinese
public positions on any international
issue, and no known difference in their
private views. *[It may exist]*

IV. Moscow and Peiping continue to coordinate
their actions in the Far Eastern Com-
munist program:

- A. They have the common aims of eliminat-
ing Western influence from the area,
annexing "colonial" Asia to the orbit,
and preventing resurgence of an armed
non-Communist Japan;

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- B. In current phase of effort, which since mid-1951 has been emphasizing political forms of action, they show same coordination that they displayed during the primarily military phase from 1948 to mid-1951;
- C. Moscow sketches the main lines of the Far Eastern program, which has relied primarily on efforts of indigenous "liberation" movements, while Peiping plays a leading role in this program;
- D. The Asian "liberation" movements -- in Korea, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia and India -- continue to acknowledge Soviet primacy while receiving outside aid principally from Peiping;

E. Rumors of Sino-Soviet disagreement on Korean issues cannot be confirmed; both seem to wish ^{to delay, prevent} ~~to liquidate an inconclusive war, to avoid~~ an expansion of hostilities, and to exploit "neutralist" sentiment in a Korean political conference;

F. Similarly, no evidence of Sino-Soviet dispute on Indochina; neither party seems to be planning another Korea-type venture in Indochina, both encourage French sentiment for a negotiated settlement

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V. Sino-Soviet economic relations show strong Soviet support of Chinese program and Chinese intention to remain faithful:

- A. Not generally realized that, ever since establishment of Peiping regime, Moscow has been careful to treat Peiping ^{with consideration} ~~fairly~~ in economic matters;

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F. China's construction program, begun this year, will depend heavily for its success on Soviet aid, Soviet loans, and Soviet bloc industrial equipment;

~~G. It is doubtful that this program would have been launched if Peking were thinking of any change in its orientation in the next several years;~~

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H. The Soviet aid agreement signed in summer 1953, after talks in Moscow beginning in August 1952, provides for Soviet assistance in the construction of 141 major projects, 50 of which are known to be under way;

Chart

I. Among the projects being completed this year are the installation of two 85,000-kilowatt turbo-generators in central Manchuria, five steel plants at Anshan (Manchuria), and 10 large machinery factories (all but one in Manchuria); Soviets nevertheless have not returned all of equipment looted from Manchuria in 1945;

J. Other evidence of integration of Chinese economy into Soviet orbit is drastic reorientation of China's trade; orbit's proportion of all China's

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foreign trade rose from 26 percent in 1950 to 72 percent in 1952 and will be about the same this year;

clean

K. Of the \$600,000,000 to \$700,000,000 worth of goods imported this year from the USSR alone (the Satellites supplying another \$200,000,000), it is estimated that military materiel and aviation equipment represent 25%, industrial and transportation equipment 20%, petroleum products 7%, metals 7%, and miscellaneous goods the remainder;

L. Possible that, during Korean war, Peiping received an outright grant or other secret loans to finance its military efforts, as its known credits and exports appeared inadequate for this purpose;

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M. Peiping's propaganda also shows recognition of the need for Soviet advisory as well as material aid, and suggests that these advisors will play an increasingly overt and authoritative role;

N. In sum, Soviet aid and credits have almost certainly been sufficient to deter Peiping from contemplating defection.

VI. Moscow and Peiping are still working to build a modern Chinese military establishment:

A. Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 provides for joint defense and both parties periodically warn the West of this fact;

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- C. Chinese Communist forces continue to
rely almost completely on the Soviets
for weapons and ammunition;
- D. At least one-third of all known Chinese
Communist ground forces have Soviet
equipment;

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- VII. Moscow and Peiping take different lines on only one known issue: The stature of Mao Tse-tung:
- A. Soviet propaganda, while recognizing Mao's "great contribution" to the Communist cause, has generally credited

him only with developing Soviet theses on the Chinese revolution rather than originating his own;

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- B. Peiping's propaganda has usually claimed for Mao a larger role as theorist and tactician, specifically citing the "ideology of Mao Tse-tung";
- C. Moreover, Peiping has continued to praise Mao's personal leadership in strong terms -- "our great leader and teacher, Mao Tse-tung" and "the era of Mao Tse-tung" -- despite the Soviet emphasis since Stalin's death on "collective leadership";
- D. However, both Moscow and Peiping are compromising in their propaganda on these points -- Moscow is granting Mao greater stature, Peiping is claiming less -- and both seem to wish to avoid a dispute.

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today no
VIII. Despite areas of potential Sino-Soviet
There is no evidence of serious
conflict, the prospect is for Sino-
friction.
~~Soviet alliance to remain firm:~~

- A. There may be disputes over the levels and terms of Soviet economic and military aid to China;
- B. Disagreement is possible on the strategy, tactics, and Soviet and Chinese roles in the Far Eastern Communist program;
- C. The Soviets may press for a stronger position in the border regions, which Peiping wishes to keep under its authority;
- D. Moscow may attempt to intervene in Chinese internal affairs, for example, the current "reorganization" of the Chinese Communist Party and

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the rate at which Peiping moves
from "new democracy" to "socialism";

E. In working out the many matters of
common concern, some friction will
be unavoidable;

F. ~~However,~~ the record of Chinese Com-
munist fidelity to Moscow, the
Kremlin's shrewd behavior with the
Chinese for the past several years,
and the many joint Sino-Soviet acti-
vities currently under way, all lead
us to believe that there will be no
significant weakening of the Sino-
Soviet alliance in the foreseeable
future.

G. No Titist movement
yet. Sov. learned lesson in
U.S. Behavior crafted in China

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IX This relates to Krenelin +
Mao relations -

Not to internal Chinese sit
Mao in full control - of army
+ administration - don't say
people happy but no open
dissent. Discontented "offic subin"
This maybe "Waste of dis -
content" due families -
bad administration

large range
X Time to cement ^{large range} cement plan
toward breaking Peking from
Moscow